This article is a case study of a little-known but important historical figure, known variously as Yang Yandi (Dương Ngạn Địch), Yang Er, and, more colloquially, "Righteous Yang" (Yang Yi), who lived during the turbulent Ming-Qing transition (1644-1684). In that age of anarchy, it was easy for charismatic individuals like Yang to possess multiple identities and affiliations-in Yang's case, pirate, rebel, and hero. Based on written historical documents and historical fieldwork, this article traces Yang's life in the chaotic water frontier of the Gulf of Tonkin and argues that he was but one in a long line of pirates and dissidents who operated in this region.
Introduction
In the first month of the Year of the Goat [1679] , the Ming leader from Longmen, Yang Yandi; his lieutenant, Huang Jin; and the leader Chen Shangchuan and his lieutenant, Chen Anping, from Gao, Lei, and Lian prefectures [in Guangdong province] brought three thousand men and over fifty warships to the estuaries of Tư Hiền and Đà Nẵng. They introduced themselves as stateless subjects of the Ming who refused to surrender to the Qing and wished to become servants [of the Nguyễn lord].
The court considered that their customs and language were different, so it would be difficult to make proper use of them; however, these men were in desperate straits and in need of succor. It so happened that Đông Phố in Chenla [Cambodia] was fertile, but the court did not yet have the resources to bring that area under control. Would not it be a good idea to use them to open up the land? It would be useful in three different ways. The lord then ordered that they be treated to a banquet and then turned them over to officials to take them to Đông Phố. (Đại Nam thực lục tiền biên 1962, 136-140) The years from 1644 to 1684 were times of chaos and anarchy in China and Vietnam.
The Sino-Vietnamese water frontier became a haven for pirates, dissidents, and refugees; it was also an area where heroes were born (see figure 1 ). Piracy, in its multiple forms, was in fact a persistent and intrinsic feature of this water frontier and a dynamic and important force that helped to shape the region's history and development. over the past several centuries. Although we do not know when Yang was born, we do know that his family hailed from southwestern Guangdong province, perhaps on the Leizhou peninsula in Suixi County or in the neighboring county to the east in Maoming. Some say he was born near Qinzhou, in present-day coastal Guangxi province.
2 All these areas claim Yang as a native son.
During the upheavals of the Ming-Qing transition, from the 1640s or 1650s through the early 1680s, Yang was most active in the Gulf of Tonkin, but he also reportedly ventured as far away as Fujian and Taiwan sometime in the 1660s. In 1682 (Vietnamese sources say 1679), when the Qing military finally drove the pirates from their bases in southwestern coastal China, Yang led about three thousand followers to southern Vietnam, where, as the Veritable Records for
Vietnam states, he sought asylum from the Nguyễn lord. In 1688, his lieutenant, Huang Jin, assassinated him in an apparent power struggle.
Over the centuries, Yang has been variously labeled pirate, rebel, Ming loyalist, and hero.
Based on historical writings, legends, and fieldwork, this article attempts to piece together, in a preliminary way, the story of Yang Yandi and his times in the nebulous water frontier of the Gulf of Tonkin. I divide the article into five sections. The first two sections are contextual: I first briefly describe the Sino-Vietnamese water frontier and then discuss in greater detail the turbulent Ming-Qing transition in the Gulf of Tonkin. In the last three sections, I examine Yang
Yandi, first as a pirate, then as a rebel, and, finally, as a local hero.
The Sino-Vietnamese Water Frontier
Yang Yandi was but one individual in a long line of pirates, rebels, and dissidents who operated throughout history on the Sino-Vietnamese water frontier, that area between the Leizhou peninsula in western Guangdong, Hainan Island, and the central and northern coastal regions of Vietnam, covering the wide water world of the Gulf of Tonkin. Except for the flatlands of the Leizhou peninsula and Red River estuary, most of the gulf's narrow coastline is hemmed with rugged mountain ranges that separate the littoral from the interior. The jagged coast is lined with innumerable bays, harbors, sandy shoals, mangrove swamps, and lagoons. Much of this region, but especially its northwestern littoral and hinterland, remained a wild frontier, with shifting borders and unruly "savages" on land and "sea bandits" offshore (see, for example, Qin zhouzhi 2009, 70). It was not until 1887, two years after the Sino-French War ended, that borders were firmly set (Fangcheng xianzhi 1993, 567-568) . 4 Before that time,
neither Vietnam nor China could say precisely where the border separating the two countries was located. Because on land the rugged terrain hindered the demarcation of exact boundaries, both countries utilized zones or belts of natural obstacles, such as mountains, deep forests, and rivers, as natural boundaries to separate one country from the other. In this area the border was simply marked by a series of military posts, which moved forward or backward according to changing circumstances. 5 Along the littoral, borders were even more imprecise, and the sea, of course, was open and boundless. This water frontier had always been a troublesome and unruly region for officials in both countries; the Chinese therefore characterized the area as a "turbulent sea frontier" inhabited by rebels, refugees, smugglers, bandits, and pirates (Pan Dingqui [1689] 1985, 4).
6
Throughout most of its history, the Gulf of Tonkin was an ungovernable no-man's-land, and even today the gulf is still a contested zone between China and Vietnam. Over the past several centuries, the gulf region experienced unrelenting internecine wars, rebellions, and border conflicts, creating political, economic, and social anarchy that was conducive to the development of protracted piracy. Merchant vessels were necessarily heavily armed and readily engaged in both trade and plunder, depending on the circumstances. Besides the innumerable local, petty gangs of pirates, which were at all times present in the region, the geographic remoteness and political instability of this sea frontier also attracted larger, well-organized gangs of professional pirates, who came mostly from outside the region to seek safe haven on the many islands and in the mangrove swamps that lined the coast. Frequently, newly arisen and relatively weak local polities, such as the Nguyễn in south-central Vietnam and the Zheng on Taiwan, directly or indirectly supported both petty and professional pirates as a means to generate revenue through plunder and as inexpensive naval forces employed to fight economic and political rivals. Pirates, too, astutely maneuvered in the contested spaces between polities, using the rivalries and wars to their own advantage. Given the hectic, uncertain conditions, sharp distinctions between trade, smuggling, and piracy were always blurry.
7 This, then, was the chaotic sea frontier in which Yang Yandi lived in the turbulent seventeenth century.
The Ming-Qing Transition in the Sino-Vietnamese Water Frontier
The Ming-Qing dynastic transition between 1644 and 1684 was a watershed event in early modern Chinese history. According to the historian Frederic Wakeman, "the fall of Ming and the rise of Qing constitute the most dramatic dynastic transition in Chinese history" (1984, 631) . Another historian describes this period as a "cataclysm" and "one of the most trying periods in Chinese history" (Struve 1998, 1) . For one contemporary witness, Chen Shunxi, it was simply a time of "chaos and abandonment" (luanli). Chen, who was a local scholar and healer in Wuchuan County in southwestern Guangdong province, kept a diary of the things he saw and heard from the 1630s to 1679, the year that he passed away (Chen [1880 (Chen [ ] 2010 Besides these large-scale social disorders, widespread banditry and piracy, urban riots, and peasant and ethnic uprisings assured that the carnage and devastation did not cease. The near-complete anarchy forced local communities to arm themselves for self-protection against all intruders: Manchu and northern soldiers, pro-Ming bands, deserters, armies of beggars and refugees, and roving gangs of bandits and pirates. Adding to the chaos were the numerous famines and epidemics, caused by both man and nature, that led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of displaced people. According to Professor Robert Marks, Guangdong's population in 1640 was about nine million, but by 1661 it had been reduced to seven million, a substantial loss of two million people, or 22 percent; by 1650, in southwestern Guangdong, nearly a quarter of the arable land was laid waste (Marks 1998, 158-159 , tables 4.1 and 4.2).
After the Manchus occupied Beijing in 1644, several Ming loyalist regimes continued to resist the Qing in the south into the 1660s. In 1646, one of the Southern Ming rulers, the Yongli Emperor, established his court in Zhaoqing on the West River, not far from Guangzhou. To dislodge the loyalist forces and conquer the province, the Qing launched two major campaigns, first in 1646 and again in 1650. In the first campaign, resistance was weak, as most Ming regulars had already deserted their posts, thereby adding to the increasing numbers of refugees, bandits, and pirates. After Qing troops took Guangzhou in the winter, and the Yongli court fled upriver into neighboring Guangxi, Li Chengdong, the Qing commander, split his army into three routes: Li led the major force to pursue the Yongli Emperor into Guangxi, while another force moved up the North River; the third force, under Xu Guodong, campaigned southwestward into Gaozhou, Leizhou, Lianzhou, and finally Hainan Island (Qingshi liezhuan 1962, j.80: 6689-6690;  see also Jiang and Fang 1993, 320-321) .
The Qing armies became greatly overextended, resulting in a political and military vacuum in many areas of the province that allowed for a further upsurge of riots, uprisings, banditry, and piracy throughout 1647. When the Qing recalled its armies to put down the disturbances in the core Pearl River Delta, several "righteous uprisings" (qiyi) erupted in the (Qingshi liezhuan 1962, j.80: 6690; Jiang and Fang 1993, 321-323) .
With so many setbacks in Guangdong, in 1649 the Qing court sent a fresh banner army under Shang Kexi to reclaim the province, and the following year, after a prolonged siege, Guangzhou fell for the second time. What followed was a bloodbath in which soldiers massacred between sixty thousand and one hundred thousand city residents (Chen [1880 (Chen [ ] 2010 Marks 1998, 149-150) . Once again, the Yongli Emperor retreated with his armies to neighboring Only the Portuguese enclave at Macao and Hainan Island escaped these bans; however, although people on Hainan were allowed to remain in their homes along the coast, they were forbidden to set out to sea to trade or fish (Jiang and Fang 1993, 330-331) .
As a result of this draconian policy, an estimated 5.3 million hectares (mu) of land remained unproductive for over twenty years. In Wuchuan County alone, for instance, by 1664 some 586 villages had to be abandoned and their fields turned to wastelands. Because several hundred thousand people suddenly lost their homes and no longer had the means to make a living, many became wandering refugees and ready recruits for the ever-increasing numbers of bandit and pirate gangs (Chen [1880 (Chen [ ] 2010 . The bans were so disruptive to maritime trade, and to the economy in general, that more than one historian has suggested that they were a major cause of the so-called "Kangxi Depression" between 1661 and 1683 (Kishimoto-Nakayama 1984; Marks 1998, 142-143, 153) . Although the bans were slightly loosened in 1669, it was not until the Qing had defeated the Zheng regime on Taiwan in 1683 that the policy was rescinded (Qing shilu Guangdong shiliao 1995, 1:103, 186, 189; and Fangcheng xianzhi chugao 2006, 795, 799) .
In the meantime, Wu Sangui, one of the three "pacification princes" in southern Once again, southwestern Guangdong was in a state of anarchy and chaos, and, as in the 1650s, many areas changed hands several times. Wu Sangui died of dysentery in 1678, and Zu Zeqing was arrested the following year and sent to Beijing, where he and his entire family were executed in 1680 (Qing shilu Guangdong shiliao 1995, 1:127-128, 132, 135-136, 138-139, 142, 146; Qingshi liezhuan 1962, 80:6658-6659; Chen [1880 Chen [ ] 2010 . Also in 1680, Shang Zhixin, after lingering in a Beijing jail for some time, was allowed to commit suicide out of respect for his father, who had served the dynasty loyally for many years (Wakeman 1985 (Wakeman , 2:1117 (Wakeman , 1119 .
With the leaders gone, Qing armies crushed the rebellion within a year.
Because of the chaos and anarchy of the times, it is difficult to make clear distinctions between regular Qing or pro-Ming military forces, rebels, bandits, pirates, and local militias. There was, in fact, as Lynn Struve has explained, "a tangled profusion of activities" that greatly blurred identities (1984, 64) . Countless numbers of army deserters, from all camps, joined the sizable bandit and pirate bands that were already active in the province. It was not unusual for Southern Ming and Qing armies to collaborate and even incorporate outlaw groups into their own forces. As Robert Marks and others point out, in most cases Ming loyalist troops were not composed of gentry-led militias but instead often contained large contingents of bandits, pirates, and deserters from one army or another (1998, 147) Village militias (tuanlian) were often no better. Many were composed of hired "braves" (yong), who were mostly unemployed young juvenile delinquents and local bullies, referred to in the records as "bare sticks" (guanggun) or "rotten lads" (lanzai). On the pretext of community defense, militias were often organized in fact to settle old scores with rival villages, as was the case in Haikang County in Leizhou. According to a local gentry named Chen Shiqi, near his home there were two villages: Taiping, which was dominated by the Tan family, and Xinqiao, dominated by the Feng family. At the start of the Kangxi period (early 1660s), both villages, using the excuse of defense against pirates and bandits, hired braves and formed militias, which in fact, engaged in feuds or "armed affrays" (xiedou) with one another (Haikang xianzhi 1812,   149 ). Sometimes, too, local militias took advantage of their numbers to plunder and burn down neighboring, often rival, villages, and kidnapped women and children for ransom (Chen [1880 (Chen [ ] 2010 Lingao xianzhi 2004, 154-155) .
Yang Yandi as Pirate
Yang Yandi lived his entire adult life during these forty years of extreme chaos and anarchy. During these troubled times, he developed a reputation as a daunting pirate chieftain. It Let me speculate a bit on Yang's motives. Certainly, as a pirate, Yang had a simple economic motive for his robberies: to make money. But there is more to the story. The years between 1656 and 1665, when Yang and his gang were actively plundering the Hainan coast, were times of repeated typhoons, floods, droughts, and famines all around Qinzhou, including in his base on Longmen Island. Hainan was the "breadbasket" (or, rather, "rice basket") of southern China, producing grains, vegetables, fruit, and livestock all year round, and there were fewer, less severe food shortages in Hainan during these years. Furthermore, the island was remote and poorly defended, and therefore a relatively easy target for hungry, rapacious pirates. In 1659, for example, Lianzhou prefecture suffered from a severe famine followed by epidemics that lasted for several years. There was a food shortage, and rice prices shot up to three silver coins per peck (dou), which was extraordinarily expensive (Qin xianzhi 1946, 890; Lianzhou fuzhi 1721, 60-61).
During that year, when Yang's gang looted the Li villages on Hainan Island, his starving men stole oxen, other livestock, and rice. In another raid in 1661, when Yang plundered Panrentang and several other villages, kidnapping women and children, he asked that the ransom be paid in grain and livestock. In other words, these were foraging raids in search of food (Yai zhouzhi 1988, 232) . Later, in 1677-1678, when there were severe food shortages across most of western Guangdong, Yang and his bands again raided Hainan and the Leizhou coasts, even blockading the ports of Leizhou city, where his men once again demanded food (Haikang xianzhi 1938, 543-544) . The point here is that many of Yang's attacks against administrative cities, port towns, markets, and villages, and even a few military bases, were conducted during times of severe food shortages in his base area on Longmen. These raids, in particular, were about survival.
Yang Yandi as Rebel
Yang Yandi emerged out of this milieu of chaos in the 1650s as a pirate and rebel leader.
But what exactly made him a "rebel," and what was he rebelling against? In official sources used in this study, the most commonly used term to indicate "rebel" or "rebelliousness" is ni, usually seen in the compounds nizei (rebel) and haini (sea rebel). Although the term rebellion implies, at least in English, overt intent to overthrow an established government, this was not the only We have strong, convincing evidence that Yang and his followers attacked Qing administrative seats and military installations and killed and wounded a number of Qing civil officials, military officers, and soldiers, which in Qing parlance qualified him as a rebel (ni).
What is less convincing, however, are the later assertions by several Chinese scholars, first in the Republican era and continuing until today, that Yang was an anti-Qing, pro-Ming rebel. There is little actual evidence that Yang was a Ming loyalist. He was most active in the years after 1650, but especially in the 1660s and 1670s, by which time the Southern Ming had been defeated and Ming restoration was only a dream. As one scholar put it, "Armies of righteousness were seldom to be seen. People harbored in their hearts the memory of Ming, but nobody started actual warfare" (Hsieh 1932, 576) . Furthermore, there is no evidence that Yang ever intended to overthrow the Qing dynasty, and his battles against the Qing can best be viewed as self-defensive or preemptive attacks carried out for his own survival. If Yang was a rebel, he was a rebel without a clear cause. He apparently fought for no cause other than his own. He was a pragmatist, not an idealist.
Yang Yandi as Hero
If he was simply a pirate, what made Yang Yandi "righteous"? The Chinese word for righteousness is yi, which, according to China historian Derk Bodde, "characterizes the conduct of those individuals who are consciously aware of the existence of certain moral standards and obligations, and who strive in their every act to live up to them to the best of their ability" (1955, 238) . These are lofty ideals that I suspect few people could live up to in real life. But here I will discuss the Yang Yandi of legends, the "righteous hero," portrayed below in a contemporary illustration (figure 6). It is impossible to know exactly when people began to call him Righteous Yang (Yang Yi). Although legends about Yang appeared in written form only in the 1930s and 1940s (during the Republican era), it is certain that they existed earlier, in one form or another, in the oral traditions of local communities around Qinzhou and Fangcheng. As several scholars have demonstrated, storytelling usually exists as an oral tradition long before the tales are put to writing. However, most stories about Yang were handed down orally from generation to generation, and few have ever been written down, even to this day. Interestingly, in many cases, the villagers I interviewed in January 2010 and July 2011 knew of Yang only by the name Righteous Yang (Yang Yi); they were completely unaware that his real name was Yang Yandi.
Some stories and yarns about Yang apparently began to be told during his lifetime, or at least soon afterward, and were recorded in local gazetteers (difangzhi) and personal memoirs Legends and rumors abound about imperial treasures being uncovered around the ruins over the past centuries: large ceramic urns filled with copper coins or, in some tales, silver dollars, pieces of jade, ancient bronze mirrors, a solid gold cat figurine, and a book made of gold (jinshu). According to one informant, the golden book was found buried beneath a mysterious tree: when it rained, it would not get wet; in the summer, it would not get warm; and in the winter, it would not get cold. The book was made up of one or several gold pages with archaic writing on them. Some say the book was actually an imperial edict, awarded to Yang for valorous service to the Ming cause; others say it was written by Yang himself, who used it to legitimize his claims as king. Although the site of the ruins is considered good land (informants said "good fengshui") and there are several villages located nearby, no one dares to live or work the land on the actual site. so the story goes, he built an altar at the highest point in or near his citadel, where he earnestly prayed to the Jade Emperor, the Sea Dragon King, and the Gods of the Mountains and Earth (in other stories, he prayed to Heaven) for help in building an escape route. Seeing that Yang fought a righteous cause-that is, that he fought against the alien Manchu invaders-the gods took pity on him and at night sent forth an army of celestial soldiers (tianbing) to dig out a canal and then brought forth a heavy rain, which allowed Yang and his men to escape to sea. Such tales are revealing: taken together, they give Yang credibility as a righteous hero.
Yang had magical powers to call down the gods, who were willing to aid him in his righteous cause against alien invaders. Objects, such as buried treasures of silver, gold, and jade, have a double meaning. On the one hand, they can be interpreted as imperial treasures bestowed on Yang by the Southern Ming emperor for his loyal and valorous services; on the other hand, they may be simply the booty Yang and his men gathered over many years of raiding expeditions.
The latter interpretation does not make Yang any less a hero in the popular imagination. Yang represented a poor commoner who made good as a righteous pirate hero, perhaps something of a "social bandit" who robbed the rich and powerful to help the poor. 
Conclusion
Throughout history, the Gulf of Tonkin has had a reputation as a "turbulent sea frontier," where piracy, smuggling, and rebellion remained endemic. Its remoteness from centers of government and its rugged coastline dotted with countless bays, islands, and mangrove swamps provided ideal geopolitical conditions for illicit activities. Until recently, the region remained a hub for pirates, who often worked in collusion with officials on both sides of the border. As late as the 1990s, for instance, pirated vessels frequently showed up in Beihai harbor, where they were repainted, refitted, and renamed, all under the watchful gaze of Chinese military and customs officers, who provided protection to the pirates in return for a share in the spoils (see, for example, Stewart 2006, 211-247) . Even today, although the pirates have mostly disappeared, the gulf is still an important smuggling zone. In fact, the area retains much of its past rough-andtumble frontier character.
Piracy played a significant role in the gulf's political, economic, and social history. For them, the same omens, such as eclipses and comets, presaged the fall of the Qing dynasty. As the writers of the 1946 Qinzhou gazetteer explain, it was wrong to treat men like Deng Yao and Yang Yandi simply as pirates, as the earlier Qing dynasty gazetteers had done, because these men had actually fought a just cause against the alien Manchu invaders, and therefore they should be considered patriotic heroes (Qin xianzhi 1946, 192, 902) . For the common people, legends, first handed down orally by storytellers and later written down by folklorists and propagandists, were the stuff of history, and in these versions of the past Yang Yandi became a righteous hero. Heaven favored and aided him, not the Qing, according to the popular tales.
Yet Yang Yandi lived in troubled times. He passed his entire adult life during a forty-year period of immense turmoil and lawlessness-truly, as Professor Lynn Struve writes, a cataclysm.
It is impossible for us to know how or what Yang felt, thought, or believed. What we do know is that under such trying conditions it was impossible to make clear distinctions between pirate, rebel, and hero. Identities were fuzzy and constantly changing. It is not so much that the Chinese sources are inconsistent or contradictory, but rather-and to the contrary-that the traditional Chinese terms for pirates, bandits, outlaws, and rebels (such as kou, zei, and sometimes ni) generally treat all these identities as categorically the same. Such terms were used indiscriminately and interchangeably. When official accounts labeled Yang Yandi as a haikou, for example, this identified him as both pirate and rebel. And when Yang and his associates plundered the Gaozhou, Leizhou, and Lianzhou coasts in 1678, for instance, officials used both the terms nizei and haizei to depict the assailants. It was highly unlikely, however, that Yang called or viewed himself as either a pirate or rebel. Although we cannot know for certain, it is easier to imagine that he thought of himself as a righteous hero, much the same way as many common people saw him. The areas that today make up coastal Guangxi-such as Hepu, Qinzhou, Longmen, and Fangcheng-were part of Guangdong province in the seventeenth century. 3
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